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IMMORTAL CURIOSITY*
ATTILA TANYI† and KARL KARLANDER‡
I. THE MAKROPULOS CASE
In his article “The Makropulos Case,” Bernard Williams claims that “immor-
tality, or a state without death, would be meaningless” and “that we could have no
reason for living eternally a human life.”1 This is so because such a life would have
nothing in it that would propel the immortal forward to the future; an endless
existence would be inevitably beset with insufferable boredom. We should there-
fore cherish our temporal finitude, and invest our energies into bettering or
enhancing our lives. We should consider ourselves to be “lucky in having the
chance to die.”2
Williams uses as a starting point for his argument a fictional case, figuring in a
play by Karel Capek, which was made into an opera by Janacek. This concerns a
woman, Elina Makropulos, who by means of an elixir of life has the opportunity to
halt the aging process. She thus lives, for as long as she chooses, a life in which her
biological age is 42. After having lived for 300 years in such a state of arrested
development, she decides to cease taking the elixir and dies. The reason for this
suicide of sorts is that “[h]er unending life has come to a state of boredom,
indifference and coldness. Everything is joyless: ‘in the end it is the same’, she
says.”3 This is because “everything that could happen and make sense to one
* This paper has benefited from the comments of audiences in Stockholm, Konstanz, Saarbrücken,
Oslo and Zurich. Attila Tanyi’s research on this paper has been funded by a project grant of the
German Research Foundation (Grant number: TA 820/1-1) and earlier by a grant of the Swedish
Research Council (Grant number: 435-2007-7830).
1 In his Problems of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1973) 82–101, at 89.
2 Ibid: 100.
3 Ibid: 82.
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particular human being of 42 had already happened to her. Or, rather, all the sorts of
things that could make sense to one woman of a certain character.”4 Williams claims
that this case is of general applicability, because of the inescapable monotony of an
extended existence. Any individual whose character remains constant, will, sooner
or later, make the same choice as Elina Makropulos; or so Williams argues.
Williams’s reasoning is best spelled out in the form of a dilemma. Start with the
notion of character without which his reasoning loses its bite. The “character” that
a person has, involves, for Williams, the “projects and attitudes which [a person]
takes seriously at the deepest level, as what his life is about.” He calls these
projects and attitudes “commitments,” “categorical desires,” or “ground projects”
at varying places in his writings.5 In the “Makropulos Case,” he understands
character in terms of categorical desires, and we will also use this terminology in
the article. These are desires that are not conditional on one’s being alive, differing
in this way from what he calls conditional desires. Categorical desires determine
whether one should keep on living in the first place: they are desires that propel
one forward, into the future, by giving one a reason to live.
Once the notion of character is in place, the dilemma unfolds. It has the following
form. Either the envisioned immortal life consists of an infinite sequence of
character shifts, of periods characterized by significant differences in personality,
interests etc., or the life is one constituted by a stable character. The former option
Williams rules out as not being something that an individual can rationally look
forward to. The second option will, according to Williams, lead to repetitive
monotony: the immortal will continue repeating the same set of experiences, as her
character, which determines what experiences are worth for her to live through, will
remain constant and thus finite. In this way she will satisfy all her categorical
desires, leaving her in a state of boredom and without any reason to continue living.
Many have criticized Williams’ argument, and we shall join their ranks. At the
same time, we shall try to make the argument as viable as possible in the face of
objections made to it. In doing this, we shall appeal to notions and arguments in
other parts of Williams’ oeuvre while holding onto to his most important back-
ground assumptions. This strategy we take to be warranted. For our aim is not to
give the most accurate exegesis of Williams’s argument, but to investigate ways of
defending it, and to do so, if needed, by means of modification and extension of
his central claims. In this way we will be in the position to attack the strongest
version of Williams’s argument, which is also what charity demands from us.
4 Ibid: 90.
5 See his “A Critique of Utilitarianism” in J. J. Smart and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism: For and
Against (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1973) 111; Williams op. cit., p. 86; “Persons, Character, and
Morality” in his Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1981) 13.
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The plan of the article is the following. We will begin with the first horn of
Williams’s dilemma: the requirement that the immortal’s character should remain
constant. We will show that this requirement is defensible contrary, perhaps, to
appearance (section II). Next, we will discuss and reject a recent attack on
Williams’s argument, by Lisa Bortolotti and Yujin Nagasawa. They argue that
Williams’s conclusion that immortality is rationally undesirable does not follow,
even if one accepts the dilemma he proposes (section III). From these we conclude
that rejecting the second horn of the dilemma is the best way to respond to
Williams. Our objection contends that Williams overlooks a basic feature of
human existence, namely curiosity, and that his negative evaluation of an eternal
life is therefore unconvincing. We shall also briefly show why our response is
superior to other responses of the same kind (section IV). In the closing section
(V), we will recap the main points of our discussion and add some (very) specu-
lative remarks about how Williams may escape our objection.
II. CHARACTER: CONSTANCY, CONTINUITY, MORALITY
Let us begin with reconstructing Williams’s reasoning for the first horn of his
dilemma. There are two crucial steps here: the turn to character and the focus on
its constancy. As for the first, the question is what justifies Williams’s choice of
putting his dilemma in terms of character, and not in terms of personal identity.
This is an important move because were Williams to defend his demands for
constancy by relying on issues of personal identity, on the requirement that it be
the same person whose existence is prolonged indefinitely, his argument would be
unconvincing.6 For one could then argue that Williams has too narrow a view of
personal identity, that allowing considerable shifts over time in the agent’s cat-
egorical desires is perfectly compatible with many appealing conceptions of
personal identity. Thus, on theories that rely on psychological continuity of a less
demanding kind, one can establish the sameness of personal identity on the basis
of, for example, the continuity of memory while allowing (almost) any kind of
change in the agent’s character. Alternatively, on theories that take personal
identity to consist in physical continuity, changes in categorical desires, at least
normally, have no effect on the agent’s body, thus on her identity.
Williams is explicit that personal identity is not enough to make his argument
work. He distinguishes between two conditions that any account that wants to
show that one has a reason to live forever, which he calls the “anti-Lucretian hope”
6 For recent examples of interpreting Williams in this way, see Lisa Bortolotti and Yujin Nagasawa,
“Immortality Without Boredom”, Ratio 22:3 (2009): 262, 265, 273, and A. W. Moore, “Williams,
Nietzsche, and the Meaninglessness of Immortality”, Mind 115 (2006): 458.
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for continuing life, must fulfil. Of these two conditions, personal identity is only
the first: “it should clearly be me who lives forever,” he says, adding that bodily
continuity is minimally sufficient for personal identity.7 The second condition
brings in the appeal to character. Here the idea is that “the state in which I survive
should be one in which, to me looking forward, will be adequately related, in the
life it presents, to those aims which I now have in wanting to survive at all.”8 Why
invoke this second condition? Williams’s underlying idea must be that when we
ask the question whether to continue our life, we are asking a question about our
categorical desires, because it is these desires that decide the question. And asking
questions about our categorical desires is the same as asking questions about our
character, which they constitute, and not about our personal identity, which, for
Williams, is a merely physical matter. Hence, the turn to character and the
invoking of the second condition.
The next question is the more difficult one: why demand constancy of character,
that is, why invoke the condition of adequate relatedness? Williams’s answer
seems to be this: it is an essential aspect of the immortal’s choice situation that the
prospect of a non-related, psychologically disjointed, infinite series of lives is not
available as a rational choice to the immortal. Because these lives comprise
different sets of categorical desires, the immortal will not suffer from the boredom
that embittered the life of Elina Makropulos. Unlike Elina, she never gets bored in
this way because she will always have new categorical desires to satisfy. This sort
of immortal existence is thus not undesirable; however, it is not a rational choice,
according to Williams. The question is why.
Williams gives the following argument.9 What interests us is the situation when
someone is rationally contemplating the choice of immortality. For the prospect of
a never-ending series of psychologically disjointed lives to make sense as an
option for the immortal, this prospect must offer her the possible existence of
characters and desires that can be, as Williams puts it, “objects of hope” now for
her, that is, when she decides. However, this is only possible if these characters
and desires are “adequately related” to her present character and desires; yet, this
is just what the idea of psychological disjointedness denies. Only categorical
desires of the immortal can propel her into the future. But when these desires are
there, the future life is not there; and when the future life is there, the desires are
not there (nor is anything properly related to them, given the absence of any
psychological connection). Hence there is nothing to propel the immortal into the
7 Williams op. cit., p. 92. This is also in line with his view of personal identity elsewhere. See his “The
Self and The Future” in his Problems of the Self, pp. 46–64.
8 Williams op. cit., p. 91.
9 Ibid: 92–93.
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future other than her existing character or desires that are adequately related to it:
constancy of character is in this way an essential feature of the immortal’s
decision situation.10
However, a psychologically disjointed, infinite series of lives is not the only
alternative way of picturing the immortal’s existence. We will discuss two pos-
sible scenarios.11 One might point out that it seems possible to maintain an
existence of constant character changes without these being “inadequately
related.” All that is needed is that we can understand “adequately related” as
making reference to the continuity of the agent’s character: as a chain of psycho-
logical connectedness, understood as, say, the counterfactual dependence of the
categorical desires of temporally contiguous pairs of characters of the same
person. In this way, the immortal’s present character can be adequately related to
a different character by establishing a chain of psychological connections between
them. The result is that we can picture the immortal’s existence as a series of lives
each with its own distinct character that are however adequately related to, that is,
psychologically continuous with the immortal’s present self. There seem to be no
conceptual or metaphysical reason to rule out this possibility and, given the
potentially infinite length of the immortal’s existence and the infinite number of
experiences she can go through during this existence, it is at least unclear why
such a scenario would even be psychologically impossible.
By having a closer look, however, it can be shown that this scenario is far from
serving as an obvious counterexample to the first horn of Williams’s dilemma.
There is, first of all, good reason to believe that the liberal understanding of
“adequately related” mentioned earlier is not something Williams would be
willing to accept. Although, as was already noted, in “The Makropulos Case”
Williams does not tell us what he takes the notion to cover, from his later writings
we can get a clearer idea. We just have to notice what Williams uses the notion for:
to determine what can give someone reasons to choose immortality. This naturally
takes us to his later theory of reasons: to his idea that all reasons are internal in the
10 Note although, that as Elijah Millgram (“On Being Bored Out of Your Mind”, Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society 104 (2004): 165–86) has pointed out, in defending the first horn of his dilemma,
Williams is presupposing a particular view of rational agency, on which leaving one’s categorical
desires behind is the same as leaving oneself behind. This idea, however, can be disputed, as
Millgram demonstrates. As noted in the introduction, we do not, however, question the assumptions
that anchor Williams’s dilemma. This would have to be done in another article, because, in the
particular case, it requires independent discussion of rational agency.
11 For a thorough critical discussion of other scenarios, see Roy W. Perrett, “Regarding Immortality”,
Religious Studies 22:2 (1986): 219–33. For a recent, more sympathetic discussion, see Christopher
Belshaw, Ten Good Questions About Life and Death (London: Blackwell) 88–90.
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sense that they must be connected to what the agent cares about.12 In a still rough,
but more precise formulation, what Williams holds is that it is either the agent’s
actual motivations that give her reasons to act, or those motivations that she can
reach via a “sound deliberative route” on the basis of her actual motivational set.
Admittedly, even this substantial reading of “adequately related” does not elimi-
nate the vagueness of the notion because Williams deliberately leaves open the
content of the notion of a “sound deliberative route.” Nevertheless, it is clear from
his writings that brain surgery, hypnosis, moving rhetoric, religious indoctrination,
or conversion are not admitted in the notion. In short, we can regard this idea as
shorthand for rational deliberation, where the account of rationality is left suffi-
ciently undetermined.
Given these ideas, it is fairly easy to reformulate Williams’s position in “The
Makropulos Case.” For the immortal’s choice the relevant motivations in her
actual motivational set are her categorical desires, plus those categorical desires
that are adequately related, that is to say, reachable via a sound deliberative route
on the basis of this motivational set. The corresponding requirement of constancy
of character is then the condition that the future character, that is, the set of
categorical desires that supposedly hold hope for the immortal at the moment of
her choice, must fall within the set of reason-providing desires as defined earlier.
Thus, for instance, Saul’s conversion to Paul on the road to Damascus would not
“produce” a new character that could give any reason for Saul to continue life,
were he to have such doubts and were he to consider the religious character of
someone like Paul as an option. There is also a corresponding notion of continuity
of character: when the immortal’s future selves are reachable via rationally con-
strained chains of connections (“sound deliberative routes”) from her present self.
It is this latter notion that we are now interested in.
At this point, it is a good idea to invoke a distinction between serial and total
immortality.13 There is a difference, between maintaining that we would, given the
choice between a mortal existence and an immortal one opt for the latter (total
immortality), and maintaining that we would, if given the choice at regular
intervals to prolong our existence a certain period of time make indefinite use of
this latter option (serial immortality). In the former case, the immortal makes a
choice for eternity: this is then a once-and-for-all decision. Therefore the series of
rationally constrained links to her future selves is further restricted by her actual
motivational set. This makes it dubious that we could recreate the kind of picture
12 For Williams’s account of internal reasons, see his “Internal and External Reasons” in his Moral
Luck, pp. 101–14, and the several follow-up articles that were later published both by him and
others.
13 Compare the distinction between necessarily body-bound and contingently body-bound immortality
in Hunter Steele, “Could Body-Bound Immortality Be Liveable?”, Mind 85 (1976): 424–27.
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the present proposal needs: to present the immortal’s existence as an infinite series
of rationally connected lives. It seems that chains of psychological connectedness
as defined earlier take one much farther away from one’s existing motivational set
than a series of sound deliberative routes, no matter how flexibly defined, would
ever do.
The suggestion then, would be that serial immortality—which, presumably, is
Williams’s preferred version—is different because in this case, the repeated
choice situations can make use of different sets of reason-grounding desires:
because, as time progresses, the immortal, in responding to the different circum-
stances (e.g., by making important decisions), changes, that is, her motivational
set changes. In this way, by making use of her changing motivational set and the
idea of rationally constrained chains of connections, the immortal can always find
something to look forward to in the future.14 That is, perhaps the immortal will
change continuously, and therefore at each and every instance of her infinite series
of choices, she will have something to look forward to in the future, given her
categorical desires at the time of her choice and the chains of rational connections
they may partake in.
However, another idea of Williams can be used to constrain infinite change in
the immortal’s character: practical necessity.15 According to Williams, certain of
our choices are governed by such necessities: we must choose and act in certain
ways in certain situations. This is because we cannot but make these choices, and
we cannot but act on them (at least, intentionally): practical necessities are best
understood in terms of the agent’s incapacities. In discovering these necessities,
moreover, the agent makes discoveries about her character: not only about its
limits, but also about its content. Given this, and given that practical necessities
cannot be cast aside, there is significant rigidity in our character. Character change
is a discovery procedure; it is a discovery of the limits as well as the substance of
one’s character, among them such rigid elements as practical necessities. If this is
so, although the immortal has an infinite range of opportunity for character
change, she cannot change limitlessly: certain aspects of her character she will not
be able to overcome, no matter how hard she tries. Hence the idea that given serial
immortality and continuously changing circumstances, the immortal can escape,
the first horn of Williams’s dilemma, collapses.
However, one could still point out that it is unclear what practical necessities—
and the corresponding incapacities—consist in; hence, it is unclear how rigid these
14 Martin Hollis (“The Shape of a Life”, World, Mind, and Ethics, ed. J. E. J. Altham (Cambridge:
Cambridge UP, 1995) 170–85, at 179–81) appears to raise just this possibility, although not in the
context of immortality.
15 See his “Practical Necessity” in his Moral Luck, pp. 124–31, esp. at pp. 129–31.
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elements of one’s character really are.16 We admit this. What is clearly included in
the notion of a practical necessity is that these elements of one’s character are not
under the agent’s rational and voluntary control. But then, the objection goes, this
does not rule out every kind of psychological change. In particular, it is possible
that certain non-rational psychological events, such as conversions, can so “shake
up” the agent’s psychology, that even the agent’s incapacities would be
eliminated—or created—in the process. Again, we admit this to be possible.
However, if this is what is supposed to save the present idea, then it is built on
sand, for radical psychological events like conversions, will arguably create a
character that is discontinuous with the previous one. Hence, the resulting exist-
ence of the immortal would be like the alternative Williams originally considered:
an infinite series of psychologically disjointed lives. And the choice of immortal-
ity, at any point of the series, would involve choosing this existence—and it was
already shown that this is not a prospect that the immortal can rationally look
forward to.
The second scenario combines elements from both horns of Williams’s
dilemma. The idea is to consider an immortal who has the desire to bring new
selves into being, no matter what they are like, no matter what character, desires
etc., they will have. The question here is what carries the weight of the response
to Williams. One option is that this desire helps us dissolve Williams’s dilemma
because it ensures that the immortal looks forward to her infinite future existence
because that will be filled with (the satisfaction of) the desires of her future selves.
However, this idea stumbles on Williams’s second condition, which demands
relatedness of character, in a way different from what we have seen so far.
The idea is that only those self-regarding desires, which involve the prospect or
image of some kind of a relatedness of character between the immortal’s present
and future selves, can make eternal life rationally desirable for the immortal.
Williams is explicit about this criterion. His example is similar to ours: the
immortal’s desire that future desires of hers be born and satisfied. “[I]f that were
the only categorical desire that carried me into it [the future life],” Williams points
out, “at least this seems demanded, that any image I have of those future desires
should make it comprehensible to me how in terms of my character they could by
my desires.”17 That is, it is not enough if a self-regarding desire is categorical; for
it to establish the right kind of, that is, character-based relation between the
immortal’s present and future lives, it must itself involve the prospect or image of
such a relation.
16 See Robert J. Gay, “Bernard Williams on Practical Necessity”, Mind 98 (1989): 551–69, for a
thorough discussion of this question.
17 Williams op. cit., p. 92, our italics.
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This appears to be a sensible extension of Williams’s condition of character-
relatedness. However, the desire in our example cannot satisfy it because this
desire cannot relate the immortal to her future selves, for the simple reason that
they are not character-related to her as she is now. They are not, in this sense, her
descendants; they are strangers whose existence she cannot look forward to. True,
they are not entirely strangers since they are bodily continuous with her; hence
continuity of personal identity, in Williams’s view, is secured. The question
whether immortality is a rational choice, however, concern character-relatedness
and this condition, in its extended understanding as presented earlier, is not met by
the desire to bring new selves into being.18
In response, one might then interpret the desire in question as a peculiar moral
desire: as an intra-personal case for caring for others. In this case, however,
another aspect of the desire will gain center stage in the response to Williams: that
it is supposedly unsatisfiable. Some claim that this is so, that moral desires, for one
reason or another, cannot be satisfied. However, we do not want to discuss this
matter at this point; we will make some speculative remarks later about an
immortal life that is solely devoted to the cause of morality. Our point now is only
that this reading of the idea is no rejection of the claim that the immortal’s
character must be considered constant for her choice of immortality to make sense
to her. It instead rejects the second horn of Williams’s dilemma, concerning
boredom. The idea, therefore, although intriguing, is irrelevant in the present
context.
III. VARIETIES OF BOREDOM
We think, therefore, that the first horn of Williams’s dilemma is, perhaps
contrary to appearance, defensible. This suggests that the best way to respond to
Williams is to focus on the second horn of his dilemma. This is indeed what we
will ultimately do; before this, however, we would like to consider a very recent
attempt that takes neither of these routes.
The idea is to show that Williams’s argument founders on a lack of attention to
the nuances of boredom. Thus Lisa Bortolotti and Yujin Nagasawa have promoted
the distinction between habitual and situational boredom as a means of circum-
venting Williams’s conclusion.19 Habitual boredom consists in disaffection with
one’s possible life projects: one is bored with life as such. It is a form of
18 This is also a response to John Martin Fischer’s objection to Williams in his “Why Immortality is
Not so Bad”, International Journal of Philosophical Studies 2:2 (1994): 262–67. Pleasure involves
no relatedness of character, only continuity of personal identity, hence it too cannot pass Williams’s
second condition, as now understood. Cf. Williams op. cit., p. 93 on pain.
19 Bortolotti and Nagasawa op. cit., pp. 268–74.
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macro-boredom to be contrasted with the micro-boredom of situational boredom.
The latter consists in a sense of tedium associated with the repetition of specific
experiences. To put it in a more Williamsian language, situational boredom is the
result of the satisfaction of one’s categorical desires, whereas habitual boredom
arises from the loss or outright absence of these desires.
The suggestion is that situational boredom need not engender habitual
boredom, and that this is sufficient to block Williams’s argument. The reason for
this is that the phenomenology of an immortal life that Williams cites is related to
situational boredom, whereas the conclusion he wants to draw is one that concerns
habitual boredom. An immortal life, on Williams’s account, involves inactivity,
withdrawal, anxiety, alienation, and the like—and these are features of habitual
boredom and not situational boredom; or so Bortolotti and Nagasawa claim with
reference to empirical research. In this way they accept most of Williams’s
dilemma (the immortal’s character remains constant and she will become bored in
the course of time), but hold that this is not enough to take us to his intended
conclusion: that an endless life would be meaningless and undesirable.
This response brings into view a crucial aspect of Williams’s argument. He in
effect makes two claims when discussing the question of boredom: one, since an
immortal life will be beset with boredom, there is strong reason against choosing
it; two, assuming the immortal maintains a constant character and can have no
unsatisfiable categorical desires, there is no reason in favor of pursuing an immor-
tal existence. What Bortolotti and Nagasawa do is to accept that boredom ensues,
but claim that this does not make ending life the rational conclusion. However, if
one accepts Williams’s second claim, that there is no reason that would favor an
immortal life, it is arguable that situational boredom would still do the work. For
it could be claimed that this kind of boredom is also reason-providing: it is bad to
be in this state, one does not want to be in it. Hence, the balance of reasons would
still clearly favor a choice against immortality.
However, Bortolotti and Nagasawa can at this point complain that this account
of Williams’s argument does not take seriously their main point: that, contrary to
Williams, immortality would not be meaningless. This is relevant because the
meaning of a life is typically considered as a positive final value, that is, desirable
for its own sake. If this is so, we have found the missing property Williams claims
the immortal life not to possess.20 It is, moreover, plausible to attribute to people
the desire to lead a meaningful life; hence, there can be good reason for us to
choose immortality, despite the kind of situational boredom that will sooner or
20 Williams op. cit., p. 89. For the view that the meaning of life is a positive final value, see Thaddeus
Metz, “The Meaning of Life”, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), Edward
N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/life-meaning/>.
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later ensue in that life. For an immortal life to be meaningless, it would have to be
spent in habitual boredom; situational boredom is no threat to meaning, or so
Bortolotti and Nagasawa claim.
We disagree. We think that the question of the phenomenology of boredom is
really just consequential upon, or indicative of the main issue: the severely
impoverished existence of the immortal. As Williams at one point puts it:
The point is not that for such a man boredom would be a tiresome consequence of the supposed
states, or activities, and that they would be objectionable just on the utilitarian or hedonistic ground
that they had this disagreeable feature . . . The point is rather that boredom . . . would be . . . a
reaction almost perceptual in character to the poverty of one’s relation to the environment.21
This passage clearly downplays the significance of the phenomenological
aspect of boredom, putting emphasis instead on its nature as a reaction. The
“deep” problem with the immortal life, the passage suggests, is not that it is felt
boring, that it is characterized by feelings of (perhaps, unbearable) tedium, but that
it is an impoverished and thus rationally undesirable existence. Boredom is a
reaction to this existence, but it is not what makes it impoverished, hence mean-
ingless. In other words, boredom is consequential upon and is therefore evidence
of the meaninglessness of the immortal’s existence, but it is not what makes this
existence meaningless. To decide whether the immortal’s life is indeed meaning-
less, we must focus on its “meaning-making” features, and these are not given by
the phenomenology of boredom.
The argument of Bortolotti and Nagasawa, therefore, does not really decide
anything of importance. They do not tell us anything about the relevant “meaning-
making” features, nor do they provide any argument to the effect that only habitual
boredom could be evidence of a meaningless life. To point out that situational
boredom is a common phenomenon or that habitual boredom is more radical in its
phenomenology, does not seem to decide anything. All sorts of lives can be
meaningless, not just the immortal’s; and it is not clear, to repeat, how and why the
supposedly more radical phenomenology of habitual boredom would be evidence
for a meaningless existence. Because of the description Williams gives, at certain
points, of Elena Makropulos, he too is to be blamed for this mistake.Yet, to repeat,
we see no reason why, without any argument given, the phenomenology of
21 Williams op. cit., p. 95. Notice, further, that already this passage (because perception is subject to
standards of correctness) and even more its continuation (where Williams alleges that one who is not
bored, would be bored in certain circumstances), suggests that Williams is willing to objectivize
boredom: the idea being that given her situation, the immortal should be bored, and would be bored,
were she to reflect more upon her situation. This suggests an alternative response to Bortolotti and
Nagasawa: that given the immortal’s impoverished situation, she has reason to be habitually bored,
even if this goes against the empirical research they appeal to.
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boredom would decide anything about the meaning of life, notwithstanding the
wording Williams at points gives of the problem. And without a clear statement on
the meaning of life, the argument of Bortolotti and Nagasawa collapses, as we
have shown earlier.
Bortolotti and Nagasawa might have a way to respond. They could accept what
we say earlier, pointing out that, indeed, Williams’s account of the meaning of life
concerns the state of the agent’s categorical desires, and her state of boredom is
only indicative of this. However, this is not decisive. For what becomes crucial
then, is to decide whether meaning only pertains to a life that has aims to achieve,
that is, categorical desires to satisfy, or it also pertains to a life that has no more
aims to achieve, but there still are aims in it, that is, all categorical desires are
satisfied, but they are not absent. The claim of Bortolotti and Nagasawa would
have to be that the latter is true and this is why Williams’s argument does not work.
There are two issues here. The first is whether this is the correct description of
Williams’s views; the second is whether it is the kind of account that Williams’s
argument must involve. As to the first, they might be right;22 as to the second, we
have serious doubts.
The question is: does an eternal life have meaning if the immortal has achieved
all that she has ever wanted to achieve? An affirmative answer is far from obvious;
it is certainly an open debate whether a negative or positive answer is the correct
one. Then, perhaps, the view should be that the immortal can, for the rest of infinity,
keep achieving these aims over and over again (if this is at all possible). However,
this parallels strongly the absurd life of Sisyphus, endlessly achieving the same aim
again and again. True, the reference to Sisyphus is also not decisive, because some
claim that such an existence is not devoid of meaning. However, this too is an open
debate and no considerations of the phenomenology of boredom can decide this
matter—yet, this is all the Bortolotti and Nagasawa provide us with.23
22 We have found one reference in his “Persons, Character and Morality”, p. 13. Note, although, that
Williams clearly thinks that satisfied categorical desires, at least in the course of an infinite
existence, will disappear. See his remarks about how categorical desires are killed by boredom in
Williams op. cit., pp. 91, 100.
23 For an overview of both debates, see Thaddeus Metz, “Recent Work on the Meaning of Life”, Ethics
112:4 (2002): 781–814, at 792–96. One might think that there exists another version of their
strategy—embracing both horns of Williams’s dilemma and still claim that his conclusion does not
follow—that works: namely, that a life lived eternally in devotion to a great moral cause would not
be a rationally undesirable one, despite the boredom that besets it. However, given Williams’s
theory of internal reasons, unless one proves that moral desires are unsatisfiable (a claim that is not
part of the suggested response and if it was, the response would have a different character, being
primarily an attack on the second horn of the dilemma), the immortal has no reason to pursue an
eternal existence for the sake of a moral cause, however great that is. Cf. Williams op. cit.,
pp. 95–96.
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IV. IMMORTAL CURIOSITY
Recall Williams’s dilemma. The immortal either goes through an infinite series
of character changes and this is incompatible with the condition of constancy of
character; or she maintains a more or less fixed character, but then boredom sooner
or later ensues. We have defended the first horn of this dilemma and rejected a
response that would endorse both horns. This leaves us with the second horn of the
dilemma. In what follows, we will provide considerations, focusing on the virtue
of curiosity, which aim to do away with the threat of boredom.
Elias Baumgarten has recently discussed the idea of curiosity as a meaning-
giving antidote to boredom. In the context of a defense of curiosity as a virtue, he
claims that, “curiosity helps people avoid a crippling obstacle to living well, the
tendency to see one’s life as meaningless.” Furthermore, “[curiosity] makes pos-
sible an engagement with the world beyond the narrow confines of our own
conscious states . . . It successfully avoids boredom and indifference”.24
Baumgarten defines curiosity as a “desire for knowledge.” He admits that not all
forms of curiosity are virtuous. This, he thinks, is tied to the object of curiosity.
Certain topics—for example, the private lives of strangers—are not fit objects for
virtuous curiosity. We think that it is also of importance how curiosity manifests
itself, not just what its object is. This is vital for our response to Williams. To see
this it is helpful to consider the notion of desire that is operative in Baumgarten’s
account. He says that “[t]he curious person will experience a lack before the desire
for a particular kind of knowledge is satisfied.”25 The kind of curiosity pictured
here is of a driven, restless kind. It is the curiosity of the fact collector, who
amasses knowledge in a field until he has exhausted the relevant facts. This form
of curiosity manifests itself in an impatient thirst for knowledge. Here one may
think of the individual who ceaselessly engages in new interests, amassing knowl-
edge about a subject, and then moving on to new ones. To be contrasted with this,
there is also the curiosity that is oriented toward the unfolding of the events of the
world. This is related to the unforeseeable nature of the course of events. Here we
find the curiosity about human progress, social, scientific development etc. “What
will happen?” is the question foremost in the mind of such an individual.
Let us distinguish, thus, between what we may call acquisitive and observa-
tional curiosity. The two kinds of curiosity also differ in the way they prompt us
to gain knowledge. Acquisitive curiosity is a desire to gain knowledge actively,
against impediments, via a strain of thought. This follows from the restless, driven
nature of the desire. Observational curiosity is a desire to gain knowledge
24 See his “Curiosity as a Moral Virtue”, The International Journal of Applied Philosophy 15:2 (2001):
section 4.
25 Ibid: section 2.
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passively, mostly because we have no other choice in the situation: this kind of
knowledge typically concerns the future or other things that are not under our
control. The desire that underlies this kind of curiosity is therefore the contem-
plative, perhaps even stoical kind.26
Arguably, both kinds of curiosity are able to avoid Williams’s challenge—by
blocking the second horn of his dilemma—because they both harbor on the
unsatisfiable nature of the desire that underlies them: a desire for knowledge. This
desire is unsatisfiable not necessarily because there exists no complete system of
knowledge. Perhaps it does. Even so, the desire for knowledge, as Neil Levy has
recently pointed out, is constitutionally open-ended in the sense that “we cannot
get a grip on what a completed system of knowledge might be.”27 That is, even if
it exists, we cannot conceive of a completed system of knowledge because “[w]e
develop the tools for understanding the knowledge we might develop as we pursue
that knowledge, in such a manner that the future directions our understanding
might take are, in principle, ungraspable by us in anything more than the most
hazy outline.”28 Because in this way the desire for knowledge is open-ended, the
threat of boredom is eliminated: “[s]ince we cannot know what the final goal
might be like, we cannot imagine completing our project, and therefore we cannot
be shaken by the image of its completion.”29
However, if indeed both types of curiosity involve some kind of desire for
knowledge and this is how they answer Williams’s challenge, then why does
distinguishing between them matter for our response to Williams? The answer is
that, rooted in their differing—in part: phenomenal—natures, observational curi-
osity has certain advantages over acquisitional curiosity both in the context of
Williams’s thought experiment as well as in respects independent of it. Merely
focusing on the desire that they both involve, blurs those differences between them
that makes one a good or, in any case, better candidate to serve in the response to
Williams, than does the other.
To begin with, acquisitive curiosity can make it difficult for the immortal to
maintain a character. This might be so for two reasons. There is, first, the threat of
variety. Williams at one point argues that an immortal existence of very varied
lives, that is, an existence resulting from an indiscriminate range of experiences,
26 For these reasons we do not think that Baumgarten is right when he focuses solely on acquisitive
curiosity, although he is not alone with this approach. See also Walter Brand (“Hume’s Account of
Curiosity and Motivation”, The Journal of Value Inquiry 43 (2009): 83–96) who attributes the same
notion to Hume. Compare, however, Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives (London:
Penguin, 1977) 57) whose words might indicate that what he has in mind is something like
observational curiosity.
27 See his “Downshifting and the Meaning of Life”, Ratio 18:2 (2005): 185.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
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would be incompatible with having a character: variety in this way poses a threat
to one’s character.30 Acquisitive curiosity might have this effect. The acquisitively
curious person seeks to amass knowledge; she does not merely let herself to be
part of the events, but seeks to actively participate in them. In this way, she is
continuously affected, not just epistemically, but in all sorts of other ways. In
short, by actively participating, she not only engages with variety, but also yields
to its whims. And this constant change might lead to the dissolution of her
character; she might, as Williams puts it, cease to be a person and become a
phenomenon.
It is however difficult to see what could be characterless about the observational
kind of curiosity. Observational curiosity is neither greedy nor impertinently
inquisitive; it is a curiosity that does not seek to amass knowledge as if it were a
commodity, but rather derives from letting one’s consciousness flow along with
the unfolding of the events of the world. The person who has an observational
sense of curiosity is characterized by an openness to experience that does not
involve an openness to being changed by the experienced; it is rather an openness
to being able to be carried along by the current of history, to be a participant, if a
passive one, in the flow of events. It seems rather to be associated with a virtuous
and humble form of openness. Being observationally curious about what will
happen next is a way of caring about the world without yielding to its whims.
Paradoxically maybe, but the opposite effect on character might also come into
play. This is our second problem: the threat of single-mindedness. This, we think,
could be a problem for many kinds of pursuits—moral, esthetic, hedonistic—if
they are stretched to infinity. Our worry is whether, in the special context of the
immortal’s life where the active, impertinent, even greedy acquisition of knowl-
edge (pleasure, moral goodness, beauty) is the sole ground for the immortal’s
continued existence (by helping her to avoid boredom), it is really possible to
pursue this activity without being absorbed in it in a single-minded way. It seems
to us that for the immortal to survive, her attention must be focused on, and her life
must be organized around this activity. This would, however, crowd out other
activities, pursuits and character traits of the immortal, leaving her merely with the
pursuit of knowledge (pleasure, moral goodness, beauty), and a one-dimensional
character. Whether or not such a simple character indeed qualifies as one, may be
an open question (e.g., one could argue that character requires some complexity),
but what certainly poses a threat to the agent’s character is the lack of an identi-
fiable, personal self. For the single-minded pursuit of such impersonal goods as
knowledge (pleasure, moral goodness, beauty) does not merely override other
interests, pursuits or even non-moral virtues of the agent, but subsume, remove,
30 Williams op. cit., pp. 93–94.
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suppress and demote them. The result is an agent who lacks entirely a personal
point of view, and, arguably, has no character.31
Observational curiosity, because of its passivity, does not seem to run into this
problem. The observationally curious person remains at a distance, yet is not
withdrawn. She cares, but she is not involved, thus allowing her other desires,
character traits etc., to play out their course. Even in an immortal existence
observational curiosity retains the potential that also acquisitive curiosity can have
in an ordinary, finite life (if it has not grown to dominate the agent’s life in the way
described earlier): to lead to a complex character. As Baumgarten points out, this
is because of the fecundity of curiosity: that it leads to other virtues, in particular
caring and concern, and that it is therefore an important aspect of close relation-
ships and autonomy. To put it in the language of desires, curiosity breeds new
desires—both categorical and conditional—in its wake.32
Another reason why it is better to focus on observational curiosity is indepen-
dent of Williams’s argument. Baumgarten struggles with this problem, but we
think there is a simple answer to it.33 In distinguishing between virtuous and
non-virtuous forms of curiosity, he makes the observation that curiosity has
typically been regarded with suspicion from a religious perspective. Regardless of
exactly how such a distinction should be drawn it seems clear that observational
curiosity has none of the problematic aspects that have been cited against the idea
of curiosity as a virtue. For these aspects all center on the idea of knowledge
acquisition, which is exactly what the notion of observational curiosity does not
need. Curiosity of the observational kind is, then, unproblematic from a religious
point of view.
Finally, relying on observational curiosity crucially complements another pos-
sible response to Williams. Jeremy Wisnewski has recently argued that even in the
immortal life new situations can emerge that give opportunity for the immortal to
continue pursuing her projects in life, thus to avoid permanent boredom.34 He uses
as example a man who has the categorical desire to be the best living musician
and, in order to satisfy his desire, he learns to play all musical instruments to
perfection. Wisnewski argues that this desire helps the immortal avoid permanent
boredom because there is always the possibility that a new musical instrument will
be invented. The idea here is that although the man may satisfy his desires at a
certain point in history and thus become temporarily bored, the desire will be
31 What one is reminded of here, of course, is Susan Wolf’s famous picture of the moral saint in her
“Moral Saints”, The Journal of Philosophy 79 (8): 419–39, esp. at 424.
32 Baumgarten op. cit., section 3. See also Brand op. cit., p. 94, for Hume’s similar views.
33 Baumgarten op. cit., section 5.
34 In his “Is the Immortal Life Worth Living?”, International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion
58 (2005): 33–36.
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revived—and boredom will end—when a new instrument is invented, and so on to
infinity. However, as noted, in Wisnewski’s example there is a moment when all
categorical desires of the immortal are satisfied and boredom ensues. In this
moment there is only the uncertain prospect of a new development, and this can
only help avoiding permanent boredom if the immortal has the hope that there will
indeed be situations in which he can take up the pursuit of his dear project again.
To be observationally curious—to be open and looking forward to future events—
is, we submit, essential to ground and enforce such a hope.35
In ending our article, we would like to consider possible objections to our
response to Williams. Consider, first, the complaint that our response cannot in
fact block the second horn of Williams’s dilemma. To test this complaint in the
context of Williams’s thought experiment, one should ask whether there is inevi-
tably a point where a person would no longer be curious about what will happen
next, where, in fact, he would rather choose mortality than stay around another day
to follow the unfolding events. However, the idea of curiosity as involving an
open-ended desire for knowledge assumes that the motivational energy of a desire
is assessed on the basis of the desire’s satisfaction conditions. Hence the answer
to the complaint is straightforward: insofar as this assumption is correct, the
motivational energy of the desire will never be exhausted. Now, of course, we are
here talking about psychology, so this claim is contingent: there can be many
factors affecting the motivational energy of a desire. But then the complaint too is
contingent. It seems implausible to claim that this kind of lack of interest would
necessarily appear sooner or later. And nothing less is enough to question the force
of our response to Williams.
The next objection points out that human history is predictable, because circu-
lar, and this is enough to bore the immortal to death at some point in her life.
However, the claim about the circularity of history is substantial; it follows neither
from the concept of history nor from obvious logical or metaphysical consider-
ations. One needs a substantive theory of history to go along with it, to make it at
all believable (we would say the same about another version of this objection: that
even if history is not circular, the same kinds of events would occur in it repeatedly
for eternity). Besides, Levy’s explanation of the open-ended nature of the desire
for knowledge still stands: it is not clear how human immortals would be able to
grasp the fact about circularity beforehand, so that it really sinks in and saps away
their motivation.
Of course, there is a perfectly reasonable methodological objection to make to
psychological speculations in the context of immortality: that we are talking about
35 Cf. Mikel Burley (“Immortality and Boredom: A Response to Wisnewski”, International Journal
for the Philosophy of Religion 65 (2009): 77–85, at 81) on the “implicit desires” that Wisnewski’s
schema needs in order to make its point.
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a being who does not, and probably will never exist (or, in any case, that we are
not aware of its existence), so how can we make any claims about its psychology?
However, what else can we do but to take existing human psychology and extrapo-
late from this case to that of the immortal? As pointed out earlier, a positive answer
to this question clearly serves as a background assumption to Williams’s thought
experiment. If, however, someone is unwilling, on principled or unprincipled
grounds, to accept this assumption, then nothing really is left for her/him to say,
and (s)he had better remain silent.36
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this article we have done four things. One, we have argued that on its best
interpretation, the first horn of Williams’s dilemma is defensible. Two, we have
shown that focusing on the phenomenology of boredom does not help to answer
Williams. Three, we have presented our own response to Williams that focuses on
the virtue of curiosity. We have argued that a particular form of curiosity, which
we have called observational curiosity, can be a standard element of immortal life
and is immune to the threat of boredom. Four, we have shown why our approach
is superior to other similar approaches in the literature.
At the same time, it is worth briefly considering what ways are open to Williams
to escape our charge. We see two routes. Both concern the larger context of
Williams’s argumentation. First, Williams can weaken the strong modality of his
position. His claim is that given human psychology, boredom necessarily ensues
in an immortal existence. However, the general argumentation of his article does
not need this strong claim. After having shown that, contrary to Lucretius, death
can be an evil, he sets out to prove that it does not follow that more life is better
than less life, hence that living eternally is necessarily the best thing to do. But this
inference is refuted by showing that sometimes immortality is not rationally
desirable; nothing stronger is needed. And this much his argument can achieve if,
as we have shown, the first horn of its dilemma can be defended.
Of course, this weaker claim is, while psychologically interesting, philosophi-
cally less exciting. A philosophically more interesting way to proceed would be to
deny that unsatisfiable desires, such as the desire for knowledge that curiosity
involves, do indeed avoid the threat of boredom. The following line of argumen-
tation might work. Let us distinguish between three things: the fulfillment, the
satisfaction, and the exhaustion of a desire. The first is a technical notion:
fulfillment conditions are determined by the intentional content of the desire.
36 As indeed, Mikel Burley (“Immortality and Meaning: Reflections on the Makropulos Debate”,
Philosophy 84 (2009): 529–47) counsels us, philosophers, to do (without ruling out talk of immor-
tality in religious uses of language).
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Satisfaction is fulfillment plus something subjective, which we can call
contentment: pleasure is a good candidate. The desire for knowledge is a desire
that cannot be fulfilled, hence it cannot be satisfied. The desire in Wisnewski’s
example, on the other hand, is a desire that is revivable, hence repeatedly satisfi-
able. Williams’s claim should then be that exhaustion of a desire is something
importantly different from these two; hence that it is possible that an unfulfilled
(unsatisfied) or repeatedly satisfied desire gets exhausted in the course of an
infinite existence. Of course, the question is how to show that this is so. Perhaps,
if what gets exhausted is the motivational power of the desire, which is shown
to be different from the desire’s satisfaction conditions, and boredom can be
demonstrated to be connected to this power, the idea could go through. How to do
this is, of course, far from clear, posing sufficient challenge to further research on
the matter.
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